Give every agent its own identity — including each running copy of the same agent.
Agents stop hiding behind shared service accounts; each one is a distinct identity your access rules can point at, audit, and revoke.
Fit agents into the identity architecture you already have — without forcing them into human or service accounts.
An agent is not simply a user, service account, or application. It may act for several people, invoke other agents, change tools during a workflow, and operate with different authority in each context.
Each row is a distinct identity your access rules can point at. The hand-off is recorded with its limits, so the authority behind the last step is still traceable to the first.
One change in your IdP. No redeploy, no new grant, no ticket for the agent’s owner.
The agent was not touched on either side of 17:58. What changed is whose authority it is carrying — resolved at the moment of the call, from the same directory your people sign in with.
Agents stop hiding behind shared service accounts; each one is a distinct identity your access rules can point at, audit, and revoke.
Identity carries accountability metadata, so every access decision can reference who is responsible and what the agent is for.
Every hand-off is recorded — user to agent, agent to sub-agent — with explicit limits instead of an implied full grant.
A single agent serving hundreds of employees evaluates each request against that employee’s own permissions, not a one-size-fits-all role.
Every call carries both, and the reachable set is where their grants overlap — which person, acting through which agent, with the smaller of the two winning.
When a coordinating agent hands work to a specialist, the originating user’s authority and its limits travel with the task.
Role changes, group moves, and departures flow from your IdP into agent permissions automatically, with no parallel directory to maintain.
Agents get an identity type that fits how they actually behave, instead of distorting your workforce or service-account models.
Explore the context attached to every request.
identity-agent has a defined purpose and a bounded set of tools.
The request acts for identity administrator, using that person’s permissions.
The policy applies to the requested action within Identity directory, before the tool executes.
Each purchase request is evaluated against the requesting employee’s own limit, so one shared agent enforces hundreds of different ceilings.
The grant covers that workflow and expires on its own instead of becoming standing authority.
The sub-agent receives only what its narrow task needs — never the coordinator’s full permissions or the user’s full token.
Role changes propagate to every agent acting for that user, narrowing their authority the moment the org chart moves.
It drops in beside your identity provider rather than replacing it. Users, groups, and roles stay where they are; Fabriq adds the layer IAM does not model — agent identities bound to human ones through explicit, scoped, per-user delegation.
No. Grants carry limits and an expiry. They can be tied to one task or workflow, and they shrink or end automatically when the underlying user’s role changes or their relationship ends.
Session revocation takes effect now, not at token expiry — and disabling an agent org-wide means its next call fails closed.
Yes. A single deployed agent evaluates every request against the permissions of the person it is acting for, so hundreds of employees can share an agent while each gets exactly their own access and limits.
Yes — every agent is registered with an owner and scopes, and every action carries two identities: the agent’s and the signed-in user it acted for.
Default-deny and additive: org, then team, then member, with reusable scope sets and per-user overrides — an agent sees only the intersection of its grants and the user’s.