Maintain an inventory of agents, owners, connected systems, and granted capabilities.
Every registered agent shows up in one view with a named owner, so “what is this bot and who runs it” stops being an investigation.
Run the agent fleet from one place: what exists, who owns it, what it connects to, and how to shut it off.
As departments deploy their own copilots and agents, IT inherits a new class of access problem. Agents connect to SaaS applications, databases, internal APIs, and automation platforms—often through individually configured service accounts, OAuth grants, and API keys.
| Agent | Owner | Connects to | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| support-triage | Support ops | Running | |
| repo-assistant | Engineering | Running | |
| deal-desk | Revenue ops | Running | |
| deck-drafter | Marketing | Disabled |
One row per registered agent: its named owner, the tools it may reach, and whether it is allowed to act at all. Disabling a row stops that agent’s access everywhere it connects, without changing a single downstream app.
In the inventory, with a named owner and a stated purpose.
A browser copilot nobody registered asks Slack for a private channel’s history.
The agent and the connection it would use are both enabled.
deck-drafter was disabled at 08:40; its 08:41 call arrives anyway.
The agent’s scope and this administrator’s own permissions.
It asks for another team’s project, which the administrator cannot open either.
Read was granted to this agent; change was not.
Change a production configuration on the monitored service.
Read the assigned service inventory.
Only one path reaches the tool, and every branch that leaves the spine is written down as well — so “why did nothing happen?” has an answer that does not start with reading an agent’s code.
Every registered agent shows up in one view with a named owner, so “what is this bot and who runs it” stops being an investigation.
Connections run on credentials Fabriq holds and manages, instead of per-project API keys and one-off grants nobody tracks.
Existing service-account sprawl collapses into scoped connections that can be inspected, rotated, and revoked from one place.
Fabriq inherits the change from your identity provider and narrows or removes the authority that user had delegated to agents.
A kill switch in one place: one action stops the agent’s access everywhere it connects, with no emergency redeploys.
Access reviews read from one central record of grants and activity — no digging through a dozen codebases.
The same policy vocabulary covers a SaaS API, an internal database, and a legacy system, because enforcement sits in front of all of them.
Explore the context attached to every request.
it-agent has a defined purpose and a bounded set of tools.
The request acts for it administrator, using that person’s permissions.
The policy applies to the requested action within Service directory, before the tool executes.
Disabling the human account also revokes the grants their personal agents inherited — the access path IAM offboarding usually misses.
Filter the inventory by connected system to see every agent touching it, who owns each one, and what it can do there.
Credentials live in the broker, not the agent, so rotation and revocation happen centrally with zero downtime for the workflow.
An agent reaches a system only once IT has connected it and granted the scope. Nothing attaches on its own, so a shadow integration has no credential and no endpoint that answers it.
No. It drops into the stack you already run and inherits users, groups, and role changes from your IdP. It adds the layer those tools do not model: agent identities, per-user delegated access, and action-level grants for every system agents touch.
Yes. Disabling the agent or its connection at the gateway stops its access to every system it reaches in one action, without redeploying applications or hunting down credentials.
Their sessions revoke immediately and their agents lose access with them — while the record of everything those agents did stays intact for review.
Yes. Access resolves per user: an agent connected by someone in support reaches support systems within that person’s permissions, and nothing else. One permissions layer covers every team’s agents instead of per-application configuration.
Sign-in comes through your existing identity provider, so there are no new accounts to create — connect your tools, register the agents people already use, and grants apply on the next call.
Yes, by architecture: keep tool credentials in Fabriq’s vault and unregistered agents have no key, no route, and no way in — nothing to hunt.