Use case · Coding Agents

Govern coding agents on developer machines

Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex work with real repos and systems — give them brokered, revocable access instead of raw keys.

The problem

Coding agents read repos, call APIs, and ship changes — powered by whatever credentials live on the laptop.

01

Raw keys pasted from ~/.env and dotfiles

02

No inventory of agents or what they reach

03

Production touched from personal machines

04

No switch to flip when something goes wrong

How a laptop agent gets brokered

Enable
You switch the agent on

Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex are enabled per organization — nothing connects uninvited.

Sign in
The developer authenticates

A device flow ties the session to a real person. No keys pasted anywhere.

Broker
Calls come through Fabriq

Credentials inject server-side at call time; dotfiles stay empty.

Revoke
One switch cuts it off

Disable the agent org-wide and its next call fails closed.

See it

💻 DEVELOPER LAPTOP
Claude Code raw keys · reads all
📁 ~/code/appreadable
🔑 ~/.sshreadable
📄 ~/Documentsreadable
AGENTIC FABRIQ
MCP broker · file & tool scopes
GitHub
prod API
Slack

Capabilities

What you get

01
Admins enable each coding agent.
Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex are switched on per org — nothing connects uninvited.
02
A broker instead of raw keys.
Copy-paste config; credentials stay in the vault, never in dotfiles.
03
Sessions visible live.
Every active broker session shows in the console, attributed to its developer.
04
A kill switch that actually kills.
Disable an agent org-wide and its next call fails closed — no key rotation scramble.
05
Every call identified to the developer.
Same permissions and the same audit trail as the rest of the fleet.
06
The whole tool hub, on the laptop.
Whatever the org has connected — repos, Slack, internal APIs — reachable through one endpoint.

The payoff

The agent on the laptop is still your agent — broker it, watch it, revoke it.

Questions

Common questions

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